Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges.
Strategy-proof social choice functions are characterized for societies where the space of alternatives is any full dimensional compact subset of a Euclidean space and all voters have generalized single-peaked preferences.
Year of publication: |
1996
|
---|---|
Authors: | Barbera, S ; Masso, J ; Serizawa, S |
Institutions: | Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
Subject: | DECISION MAKING | VOTING | ELECTIONS |
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