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Strategy Proofness, Pareto Optimality and Strictly Convex Norms.

Van Der Stel, H. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

A voting scheme assigns to each profile of alternatives chosen by "n" individuals a compromise alternative. Here the … strictly convex norm, common to all agents. A voting scheme is strategy-proof, if voting for one's best point is an optimal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572221

Strategy-Proofness and Single-Plateaued Preferences.

Colom, D.B. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

In the framework of the provision of one pure public good, we characterize the class of strategy-proof voting schemes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582664

Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges.

Barbera, S; Masso, J; Serizawa, S - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

Strategy-proof social choice functions are characterized for societies where the space of alternatives is any full dimensional compact subset of a Euclidean space and all voters have generalized single-peaked preferences.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168441

Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism

Aragones, Enriqueta; Xefteris, Dimitrios - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2013

We analyze a unidimensional model of two-candidate electoral competition where voters have im- perfect information about the candidates' policy proposals, that is, voters cannot observe the exact policy proposals of the candidates but only which candidate offers the most leftist/rightist...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836472

Work Values, Endogenous Sentiments and Redistribution

Cervellati, Matteo; Esteban, Joan; Kranich, Laurence - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010

voting over redistribution. Agents have moral "work values". Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are … endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social … preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008540822

Voting by Committees under Constraints

Salvador BARBER?; Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2001

characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572210

Voting by Committees with Exit

Berga, Dolors; Gustavo Berganti?s; Jordi … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2002

We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barber?Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582717

Algebraic Properties of Effectivity Functions.

Gurvich, V.A. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824000

Voting Under Constraints.

Barbera, S.; Masso, J.; Neme, A. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005350798

STRATEGY-PROOF VOTING SCHEMES WITH CONTINUOUS PREFERENCES

BARBERA, S.; PELEG, B. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1988

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005350804