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Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges.

Barbera, S; Masso, J; Serizawa, S - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

Strategy-proof social choice functions are characterized for societies where the space of alternatives is any full dimensional compact subset of a Euclidean space and all voters have generalized single-peaked preferences.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168441

Strategy-Proofness and Single-Plateaued Preferences.

Colom, D.B. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

In the framework of the provision of one pure public good, we characterize the class of strategy-proof voting schemes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582664

Strategy Proofness, Pareto Optimality and Strictly Convex Norms.

Van Der Stel, H. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

A voting scheme assigns to each profile of alternatives chosen by "n" individuals a compromise alternative. Here the … strictly convex norm, common to all agents. A voting scheme is strategy-proof, if voting for one's best point is an optimal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572221

Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism

Aragones, Enriqueta; Xefteris, Dimitrios - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2013

We analyze a unidimensional model of two-candidate electoral competition where voters have im- perfect information about the candidates' policy proposals, that is, voters cannot observe the exact policy proposals of the candidates but only which candidate offers the most leftist/rightist...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836472

Work Values, Endogenous Sentiments and Redistribution

Cervellati, Matteo; Esteban, Joan; Kranich, Laurence - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010

voting over redistribution. Agents have moral "work values". Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are … endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social … preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008540822

Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule

Salvador Barber?Author-Email: salvador.barbera@uab.es; … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2002

We present a new domain of preferences under which the majority relation is always quasi-transitive and thus Condorcet winners always exist. We model situations where a set of individuals must choose one individual in the group. Agents are connected through some relationship that can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247861