from common property resource experiments (Casari and Plott, 2003). Instead of positing individual-specific utility … experiments. …

experimental results to test the practical tractability and effectiveness of the multibidding mechanisms in environments where …

We discuss how technologies of peer punishment might bias the results that are observed in experiments. A crucial … the punishing subject has to pay to inflict punishment. We show that a punishment technology commonly used in experiments …

strategies. We run experiments for markets with two and three identical firms. Firms tend to cooperate to avoid fights, but when …We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a … highest possible one for markets both with two and three firms. …

experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory …

We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms. Our treatments …

games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two … exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the … selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how the R solution changes important conclusions of several well known …

bargaining among alternative candidates. We allow for firm asymmetries and, in particular, we emphasize the fact that potential …. Such bargaining failures have important implications for the ex-ante optimal merger policy. We show that a more stringent … policy than the ex-post optimal reduces the scope of these bargaining failures and raises expected social surplus. We use a …

matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized …