Similar Search Results

An Explicit Bound on epsilon for Non-Emptiness of the epsilon-Core of an Arbitrary Game with Side Payments.

Kovalenkov, A.; Holtz Wooders, M. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1997

We introduce the concept of a paramaterized collection of games with side payments and determine a bound on epsilon so that all sufficiently large games in such a collection have non-emplty epsilon-cores. A parametrized collection of games is described by (a) the number of approximate player...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823899

Search and bargaining in large markets with homogeneous traders

Clara Ponsat?Author-Email: Clara.ponsati@uab.es - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2001

We study pair-wise decentralized trade in dynamic markets with homogeneous, non-atomic, buyers and sellers that wish to exchange one unit. Pairs of traders are randomly matched and bargaining a price under rules that offer the freedom to quit the match at any time. Market equilbria, prices and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823976

Strategy-proof social choice

Barberà, Salvador - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010

This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584608

Consumers' Behavior and the Bertrand Paradox: An ACE approach

Vilà, Xavier - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2005

We analyze the classical Bertrand model when consumers exhibit some strategic behavior in deciding from which seller they will buy. We use two related but different tools. Both consider a probabilistic learning (or evolutionary) mechanism, and in the two of them consumers' behavior in uences the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572138

Structural Inferences from First-Price Auction Experiments

Pezanis-Christou, Paul; Romeu, Andres - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2002

We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction experiments. We … identify conditions to test the Nash equilibrium models for homogenous and for heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion … have been affected by the procedure used to conduct the experiments and that the usual Nash equilibrium model for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247845

A Simple Test of Explanations for Contributions in Social Dilemmas.

Bolton, G; Brandts, J; Katok, E - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

We test competing explanations for contributions in social dilemma games. Hypotheses are classified in two ways : bgy key concept and by strategy sensitivity.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168466

An Explicit Bound On epsilon for Non-Emptiness of the epsilon-Core of an Arbitrary Game Without Side Payments.

Kovalenkov, A.; Holtz Wooders, M. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1997

We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on epsilon so that all sufficiently large games in the collection have non-empty epsilon-cores. The required size of epsilon depends on: (a)the number of approximate player types and the accuracy of this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168489

Epsilon Cores of Games and Economies With Limited Side Payments.

Kovalenkov, A.; Holtz Wooders, M. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1997

We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility. Under the assumption that the payoff set of the grand coalition is convex, we show that a large game with limited side payments has a non-empty epsilon-core. Our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168507

Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by Market Games

Carmen Bevi?Author-Email: Carmen.Bevia@uab.es; Luis C. … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, …

In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572139

Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Gregarious Preferences

Massó, Jordi; Nicolò, Antonio - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2007

equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823903