Showing 1 - 10 of 11
Function g selects exactly k alternatives as a function of the preferences of n individuals. It cannot be manipulated by any individual, assuming that an individual prefers set A to B whenever A can be obtained from B by eliminating some alternatives and replacing each with a preferred...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588170
A substantial theoretical and experimental literature has focused on the conditions under which cooperative behavior among actors providing public goods or extracting common-pool resources arises. The literature identifies the importance of coercion, small groups of actors, or the existence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588172
The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and there is a positive number β such that each pair of alternatives can be socially ordered without having to consult individual preference over a set with more than β alternatives then there are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588173
For four alternatives and an even number of individuals, we prove a conjecture in a companion paper: It is impossible for a social choice rule to satisfy all of (1) Pareto, (2) anonymity, (3) full domain, and (4) independence of some alternative, a relaxation of ArrowÕs IIA.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588176
In this paper we assess the effectiveness of suicide attacks and targeted killings in the Second Intifada. We find evidence that the targeted killings of Palestinian leaders by Israel reduce realized Palestinian violence. We find, however, that intended Palestinian violence is increasing at low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588178
For a finite number of alternatives, in the presence of Pareto, non-dictatorship, full domain, and transitivity, an extremely weak independence condition is incompatible with each of anonymity and neutrality (Campbell and Kelly [2006]). This paper explores how those results are affected when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588182
For an odd number of individuals Campbell and Kelly [2] show that over the set of profiles that admit a strong Condorcet winner, majority rule is the only non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice function. This paper shows that the situation is quite different in the case of an even number...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247919
In the presence of Pareto, non-dictatorship, full domain, and transitivity, an extremely weak independence condition disallows both anonymity and neutrality.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252281
This paper studies the dynamics of violence in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict since the outbreak of the Second (or "Al-Aqsa") Intifada in September 2000, during which more than 3,300 Palestinians and more than 1,000 Israelis have been killed. The conflict has followed an uneven pattern, with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168595
In this study we extend our previous work to examine the dynamic relationship between violence committed by Palestinian factions and that committed by Israel during the Second Intifada. We find a statistically significant relationship between Israeli fatalities claimed by groups associated with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168599