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Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the Demand for Medigap Insurance

Keane, Michael; Stavrunova, Olena - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2012

The size of adverse selection and moral hazard effects in health insurance markets has important policy implications. For example, if adverse selection effects are small while moral hazard effects are large, conventional remedies for inefficiencies created by adverse selection (e.g., mandatory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004305

Industrial Structure, Executives' Pay And Myopic Risk Taking

Thanassoulis, John - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2011

This study outlines a new theory linking industrial structure to optimal employment contracts and value reducing risk … taking. Firms hire their executives using optimal contracts derived within a competitive labour market. To motivate effort … firms hire executives on contracts tolerant of myopic risk taking, smaller firms ensure myopia is ruled out. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009320222

Bankers' Pay Structure And Risk

Thanassoulis, John - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2011

. If competition grows strong enough, contracts which permit some risk-shifting become optimal. Empirically I demonstrate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914377

Emerging Markets and Entry by Actively Managed Funds

Guembel, Alexander - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2001

contracts for managers are derived for the case when one or two managers are active in a market. It is shown that wage contracts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661424

Debt Forgiveness: The Case for Hyper-Incentive Contracts

Menzies, Gordon - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

fuller rationale for case-by-case debt-overhang contracts. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605303

Gaming and Strategic Ambiguity in Incentive Provision

Meyer, Margaret; Ederer, Florian; Holden, Richard - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2013

It is often suggested that incentive schemes under moral hazard can be gamed by an agent with superior knowledge of the environment, and that deliberate lack of transparency about the incentive scheme can reduce gaming. We formally investigate these arguments. Ambiguous incentive schemes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004313