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Gaming and Strategic Ambiguity in Incentive Provision

Meyer, Margaret; Ederer, Florian; Holden, Richard - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2013

It is often suggested that incentive schemes under moral hazard can be gamed by an agent with superior knowledge of the environment, and that deliberate lack of transparency about the incentive scheme can reduce gaming. We formally investigate these arguments. Ambiguous incentive schemes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004313

Ambiguity Aversion and the Absence of Indexed Debt

Mukerji, Sujoy; Tallon, Jean-Marc - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

-standing support among economists for indexation of loan contracts there has been relatively little use of indexation, except in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605029

The Response of Oil Contracts to Extreme Price Movements

Bindemann, Kirsten - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

This study examines the response of oil contracts to extreme price movements. The chosen contract form is a Production …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605056

The Nature of Employment in India's Services Sector: Exploring the Heterogeneity

Nayyar, Gaurav - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2009

For some observers, the dramatic growth of the services sector in India reflects rapid strides made by educated professionals. Some others see it as the expansion of an employer of last resort. Given this heterogeneity, the object of the paper is to analyze the nature of employment being...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008481991

Debt Forgiveness: the Case for Hyper-Incentive Contracts.

Douglas Menzies, G. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

fuller rationale for case-by-case debt-overhang contracts. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047754

Evading the 'Taint of Usury' Complex Contracts and Segmented Capital Markets

Koyama, Mark - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2008

were able to write licit contracts, the prohibition had the effect of segmenting markets in which formal credit was …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047766

The Response of Oil Contracts to Extreme Price Movoments.

Bindemann, K. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

This study examines the response of oil contracts to extreme price movements. The chosen contract form is a Production …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047872

Ambiguity Aversion and the Absence of Indexed Debt.

Mukerji, S.; Tallon, J.-M. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

Inspite of wide and long-standing support among economists for indexation of loan contracts there has been relatively …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047922

Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the Demand for Medigap Insurance

Keane, Michael; Stavrunova, Olena - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2012

The size of adverse selection and moral hazard effects in health insurance markets has important policy implications. For example, if adverse selection effects are small while moral hazard effects are large, conventional remedies for inefficiencies created by adverse selection (e.g., mandatory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004305

Industrial Structure, Executives' Pay And Myopic Risk Taking

Thanassoulis, John - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2011

This study outlines a new theory linking industrial structure to optimal employment contracts and value reducing risk … taking. Firms hire their executives using optimal contracts derived within a competitive labour market. To motivate effort … firms hire executives on contracts tolerant of myopic risk taking, smaller firms ensure myopia is ruled out. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009320222