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Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?

Klemperer, Paul; Bulow, Jeremy - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2009

We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004186

Public or private equity? How accelerated IPOs can increase competition in offerings

Jenkinson, Tim - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2008

This clinical paper analyses a new way of conducting IPOs which has recently been introduced in the U.K. The essential feature of Accelerated IPOs (aIPOs) is that investors from syndicates to bid for the entire offering, and then execute an immediate IPO (within a week). Vendors can use an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004200

Online Advertising and Privacy

Cornière, Alexandre de; Nijs, Romain De - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2013

An online platform makes a profit by auctioning an advertising slot that appears whenever a consumer visits its website. Several firms compete in the auction, and consumers differ in their preferences. Prior to the auction, the platform gathers data which is statistically correlated with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004283

Auctions: Theory and Practice

Klemperer, Paul - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2004

picking selectively â€“ an advanced undergraduate or MBA course on auctions and auction design. Part A introduces the basic … superficially unconnected with auctions. Part C discusses practical auction design. Part D describes the one-hundred-billion dollar … 3G mobile-phone license auctions. None of the writing is technical, except in the Appendices. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011133069

Toeholds and Takeovers

Klemperer, Paul; Bulow, Jeremy - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 1998

Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. A bidder with a toehold bids aggressively in a standard ascending auction because its offers are both bids for the remaining shares and asks for its own holdings. While the direct effect of a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604835

Why Every Economist Should Learn some Auction Theory

Klemperer, Paul - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

None available

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604844

When are Auctions Best?

Klemperer, Paul; Bulow, Jeremy - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2007

We compare the two most common bidding processes for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly to buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding earlier entrants can make bids before later entrants choose whether to compete....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604887

Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature

Klemperer, Paul - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 1999

a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed,), Edward Elgar (pub.), 1999.) We begin with the … most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and … marginal revenues. Subsequent sections address risk-aversion, affiliation, asymmetries, entry, collusion, multi-unit auctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604889

The Generalized War of Attrition

Klemperer, Paul; Bulow, Jeremy - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 1997

We model a War of Attrition with N+K firms competing for N prizes. If firms must pay their full costs until the whole game ends, even after dropping out themselves (as in a standard-setting context), each firms exit time is independent both of K and of other players actions. If, instead, firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605042

The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences

Klemperer, Paul; Binmore, Ken - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2001

the time as the biggest auction ever. We discuss the merits of auctions versus beauty contests, the aims of the auction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605087