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Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?
Klemperer, Paul; Bulow, Jeremy - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2009
We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding.  The sequential process is always more efficient.  But...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004186
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When are Auctions Best?
Klemperer, Paul; Bulow, Jeremy - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2007
We compare the two most common bidding processes for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly to buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding earlier entrants can make bids before later entrants choose whether to compete....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604887
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Toeholds and Takeovers
Klemperer, Paul; Bulow, Jeremy - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 1998
Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. A bidder with a toehold bids aggressively in a standard ascending auction because its offers are both bids for the remaining shares and asks for its own holdings. While the direct effect of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604835
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Why Every Economist Should Learn some Auction Theory
Klemperer, Paul - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000
None available
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604844
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Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
Klemperer, Paul - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 1999
a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed,), Edward Elgar (pub.), 1999.) We begin with the … most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and … marginal revenues. Subsequent sections address risk-aversion, affiliation, asymmetries, entry, collusion, multi-unit auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604889
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The Generalized War of Attrition
Klemperer, Paul; Bulow, Jeremy - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 1997
We model a War of Attrition with N+K firms competing for N prizes. If firms must pay their full costs until the whole game ends, even after dropping out themselves (as in a standard-setting context), each firms exit time is independent both of K and of other players actions. If, instead, firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605042
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The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences
Klemperer, Paul; Binmore, Ken - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2001
the time as the biggest auction ever. We discuss the merits of auctions versus beauty contests, the aims of the auction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605087
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How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions
Klemperer, Paul - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2001
auctions, from 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to 650 Euros per capita in the U.K., though the values of the licences sold …. The sequencing of the auctions was also crucial. We discuss the auctions in the U.K., Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605103
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Applying Auction Theory to Economics
Klemperer, Paul - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000
economic settings that do not, at first sight, look like auctions. We also discuss some more obvious applications, especially …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605125
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Some Observations on the British and German 3G Telecom Auctions
Klemperer, Paul - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2002
I suggest explanations for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 British and German 3G telecom auctions …. This paper bundles my comments on two papers presented at the December 2001 CES Ifo conference on the telecom auctions …. (For those readers new to the subject, I recommend first reading How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605188