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Active agents, passive principals; the role of the chief executive in corporate strategy formulation and implementation
Dow, James - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000
In this paper we use agency theory to study the active role of the chief executive in the formulation of corporate strategy. Unlike traditional applications of agency theory, we allow the agent (CEO) to play a role in defining the parameters of the agency problem. We argue that CEOs will have an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661432
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Stock Based Compensation: Firm-specific risk, Efficiency and Incentives
Henderson, Vicky - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2001
This paper examines the efficiency of stock based compensation by valuing stock and options from the executive`s point of view. Companies give compensation in the form of stock in order to align incentives by providing a link between executive wealth and the stock price performance of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661420
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Race to the top or bottom? Corporate governance, freedom of reincorporation and competition in law
Mayer, Colin; Fluck, Zsuzsanna - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2005
This paper investigates the governance structure choices of firms when there is competition between legal systems. We study the impact of the allocation of control over choice of governance and reincorporation on firms` technologies and technological specialization of countries in the context of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661413
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Toeholds and Takeovers
Klemperer, Paul; Bulow, Jeremy - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 1998
Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. A bidder with a toehold bids aggressively in a standard ascending auction because its offers are both bids for the remaining shares and asks for its own holdings. While the direct effect of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604835
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Bank Efficiency, Ownership and Market Structure,Why are Interest Spreads so High in Uganda?
Hesse, Heiko; Beck, Thorsten - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2006
Using a unique bank-level dataset on the Ugandan banking system over the period 1999 to 2005, we explore the factors … find a robust and economically significant relationship between privatization, foreign bank entry, market structure and … banking efficiency. Similarly, macroeconomic variables can explain little of the over-time variation in bank spreads. Bank …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047833
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Bankers' Pay Structure And Risk
Thanassoulis, John - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2011
This paper studies the contracting problem between banks and their bankers, embedded in a competitive labour market for banker talent.  To motivate effort banks must use some variable remuneration.  Such remuneration introduces a risk-shifting problem by creating incentives to inflate early...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914377
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Industrial Structure, Executives' Pay And Myopic Risk Taking
Thanassoulis, John - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2011
This study outlines a new theory linking industrial structure to optimal employment contracts and value reducing risk taking.  Firms hire their executives using optimal contracts derived within a competitive labour market.  To motivate effort firms must use some variable remuneration.  Such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009320222
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The Case For Intervening In Bankers' Pay
Thanassoulis, John - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2011
This paper studies banker remuneration in a competitive market for banker talent.  I model, and then calibrate, the default risk of the banks generated by investments and remuneration pressures.  Competing banks prefer to pay their banking staff in bonuses and not in wages as risk sharing on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008829643
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Capital Structure and Seniority in Entrepreneurial Firms
Ippolito, Filippo - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2005
We present a model of cash constrained entrepreneurs who need an investor to finance their project. Investors can either be uninformed, such as individual bondholders, or informed, such as venture capitalists and banks. There is an entrepreneurial moral hazard problem, which can be partially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661398
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Desert and Inequity Aversion in Teams
Gill, David; Stone, Rebecca - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2011
Teams are becoming increasingly important in work settings.  We develop a framework to study the strategic implications of a meritocratic notion of desert under which team members care about receiving what they feel they deserve.  Team members find it painful to receive less than their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009275434