This paper investigates the governance structure choices of firms when there is competition between legal systems. We study the impact of the allocation of control over choice of governance and reincorporation on firms` technologies and technological specialization of countries in the context of...

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We study how deregulation of corporate law affects the decision of entrepreneurs of where to incorporate.  Recent rulings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have enabled entrepreneurs to select their country of incorporation independently of their real seat.  We analyze foreign...

We model corporate governance in a world with competitive securities markets as well as markets for corporate assets.  We show that varying the liquidity and opacity of corporate assets, the vitality of the market for corporate control, and the costs of enforcing shareholder rights to cash...

We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding.  The sequential process is always more efficient.  But...

We generalize the class of apex game by combining a winning coalition of symmetric minor players with a collection of apex sets which can form winning coalitions only together with a fixed quota of minor players.  By applying power indices to these games and their subgames we generate players'...

We model long-run firm performance, management compensation, and corporate governance in a dynamic, nonstationary world.  We show that managerial compensation and governance policies, which, in a single-period context, can best be rationalized by self-serving managerial influence over board...

This paper analyses the real economy effects of firms having some shareholders with a short investment horizon on their shareholder register.  Short-term shareholders cause management to be concerned with the path of the share price as well as its ultimate value.  Such shareholders in an...

This study outlines a new theory linking industrial structure to optimal employment contracts and value reducing risk taking.  Firms hire their executives using optimal contracts derived within a competitive labour market.  To motivate effort firms must use some variable remuneration.  Such...

Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. A bidder with a toehold bids aggressively in a standard ascending auction because its offers are both bids for the remaining shares and asks for its own holdings. While the direct effect of a...