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Stock Based Compensation: Firm-specific risk, Efficiency and Incentives

Henderson, Vicky - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2001

-specific risk, and thus hold a less than fully diversified portfolio. Since firm-specific risk is not priced, this leads to the … market risk, but are subject to firm-specific risk for incentive purposes. By distinguishing between these two types of risks …, we are able to examine the effect of stock volatility, firm-specific risk, market risk and the correlation between the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661420

Job Design and the Benefits of Private Trade

Casas-Arce, Pablo; Hejeebu, Santhi - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2004

We reconsider the job design theory of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), to include career concerns considerations. When reputations are considered, discretion may play a more integral part of the incentive scheme. It can be a useful instrument to enhance incentives and prevent the adverse selection...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051062

Active agents, passive principals; the role of the chief executive in corporate strategy formulation and implementation

Dow, James - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

mitigate this by precommitting to pay high compensation regardless of the manager`s chosen strategy, but may optimally prefer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661432

The Demise of Investment-Banking Partnerships: Theory and Evidence

Morrison, Alan; Wilhelm, William J. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2004

Until 1970, the New York Stock Exchange prohibited public incorporation of member firms. After the rules were relaxed to allow joint stock firm membership, investment-banking concerns organized as partnerships or closely-held private corporations went public in waves, with Goldman Sachs (1999)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661417

Do Managers with Limited Liability Take More Risky Decisions? An Information Acquisition Model

Malcomson, James - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2009

Risk-neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability. Risk-neutral managers may not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008459580

Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle.

Fairburn, J.A.; Malcomson, J.M. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

reduces the incentive for managers to be affected by influence activities that would blunt the effectiveness of monetary … bonuses. When employees are risk neutral, use of promotion for incentives need not distort assignments. When they are risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090683

Cheating in the workplace: An experimental study of the impact of bonuses and productivity

Gill, David; Prowse, Victoria; Vlassopoulos, Michael - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2013

We use an online real-effort experiment to investigate how bonus-based pay and worker productivity interact with workplace cheating. Firms often use bonus-based compensation plans, such as group bonuses and firm-wide profit sharing, that induce considerable uncertainty in how much workers are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004382

Desert and Inequity Aversion in Teams

Gill, David; Stone, Rebecca - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2011

Teams are becoming increasingly important in work settings. We develop a framework to study the strategic implications of a meritocratic notion of desert under which team members care about receiving what they feel they deserve. Team members find it painful to receive less than their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009275434

Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle

Malcomson, James; Fairburn, James A. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604903

Strategic incentives for market share

Ritz, Robert - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2005

Market share objectives are prominent in many industries, especially where managers pay much attention to league table … rankings. This paper explores the strategic rationale for giving managers incentives based on market share in an oligopoly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047966