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WHY ARE THERE DEMOCRACIES? A PRINCIPAL AGENT ANSWER

O'FLAHERTY, B. - Department of Economics, School of Arts and Sciences - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005549156

Identification and Kullback Information in the GLSEM.

Dhrymes, P.J. - Department of Economics, School of Arts and Sciences - 1996

In this paper we employ the Kullback Information apparatus in (a) obtaining the strong consistency of the maximum …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005549167

Finite Horizon Optimization: Sensitivity and Continuity in Multi-Sectoral Models.

Dutta, P. - Department of Economics, School of Arts and Sciences - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005344635

TIME DEPENDENT RULES, AGGREGATE STICKINESS AND INFORMATION EXTERNALITIES

CABALLERO, R.J. - Department of Economics, School of Arts and Sciences - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005227095

Business as Usual, Market Crashes and Wisdom After the Fact.

Caplin, A.; Leahy, J. - Department of Economics, School of Arts and Sciences - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005227111

Informational Leverage and the Endogenous Timing of Product Introductions.

Choi, J.P. - Department of Economics, School of Arts and Sciences - 1996

tying a product of established quality to one of unknown quality may mitigate the problem of asymetric information … encountered in the latter market. Leveraging reputation in one market to provide information about product quality in a second …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005162754

Institutional Solutions to the Principal-Agent Problem in African Health Care.

Leonard, K.L.; Leonard, D.K. - Department of Economics, School of Arts and Sciences - 1998

troubled with imperfect information. Therefore it is no surprise that free markets and spot contracts do not lead to an … necessary to solve the problems of imperfect information in this context. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005162760

How To Compensate Physicians When Both Patient and Physician Effort Are Unobservable.

Leonard, K.L.; Zivin, J. - Department of Economics, School of Arts and Sciences - 2000

In this paper, we construct a joint production model of health with two-sided asymmetric information and ask the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005687391

A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games.

Dutta, P.K. - Department of Economics, School of Arts and Sciences - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005687394

Wage determination of Registered Nurses in Proprietary and Non-Profit Nursing Homes.

Holtmann, A.G.; Idson, T.L. - Department of Economics, School of Arts and Sciences - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005687415