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Informational size and two-stage mechanisms

McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2015

We showed in McLean and Postlewaite (2014) that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modifications to VCG mechanisms in interdependent value problems that restore incentive compatibility. This paper presents a two-stage mechanism that similarly restores incentive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011193604

Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Second Version

McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2002

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent’s type affects other agents’ utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604557

Simple Auctions, Second Version

Compte, Olivier; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2010

modeling agents who lack detailed knowledge of prior distributions. In auctions, that agents know priors has two consequences … such complex inferences are precluded. This is done in a parsimonious model of auctions in which agents are restricted to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010822935

Implementation with Interdependent Valuations

McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150196

Informational Size and Efficient Auctions

McLean, Richard; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2002

We develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional signals in which agents’ signals are correlated. We provide conditions under which a modification of the Vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ex post efficient outcome....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102109

Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?

Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2003

In this paper we investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms’ ability to sustain collusion. We show in … a number of models that the net effect of vertical integration is to facilitate collusion. Several effects arise. When … upstream offers are secret, vertical mergers facilitate collusion through the operation of an outlets effect: Cheating …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126686

Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion? Second Version

Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2003

We investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms' ability to sustain tacit collusion in a repeated game …. We identify several effects and show that the net effect of vertical integration is to facilitate collusion. Most … importantly, vertical mergers facilitate collusion through the operation of an outlets effect: cheating unintegrated firms can no …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005061911

The Role of Quality in Service Markets Organized as Multi-Attribute Auctions

Krasnokutskaya, Elena; Song, Kyungchul; Tang, Xun - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2013

-attribute auctions in which buyers take into account seller's price as well as various characteristics, including quality. Our …-attribute auctions as is common in public procurement. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010822892