Different markets are cleared by different types of prices---seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in some markets, and personalized prices tailored to the buyer in others. We examine a setting in which buyers and sellers make investments before matching in a competitive market....

We analyze a model in which agents make investments and then match into pairs to create a surplus. The agents can make transfers to reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus. Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2013) showed that when investments are unobservable, equilibrium...

We examine markets in which agents make investments and then match into pairs, creating surpluses that depend on their investments and that can be split between the matched agents. In general, each of the matched agents would ”own" part of the surplus in the absence of interagent transfers....

The majority of results in the literature on general equilibrium are not for an economy (i.e. given an endowment and preferences), but rather, for a set of economies (i.e. a set of endowments given preferences). Therefore, we argue that the most appropriate robustness result requires perturbing...

Different markets are cleared by different types of prices---a universal price for all buyers and sellers in some markets, seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in others, and personalized prices tailored to both the buyer and the seller in yet others. We introduce the notion of...

In this paper we examine non-parametric restrictions on counterfactual analysis in a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Under the assumption of time-separable expected utility and complete markets all equilibria in this model are stationary, the Arrow-Debreu prices uniquely...

We study transactions that require investments before trading in a competitive market, when forward contracts fixing the transaction price are absent. We show that, despite the market being perfectly competitive and subject to arbitrarily little uncertainty, the inability to jointly determine...

We study transactions that require investments before trading in a competitive market, when forward contracts fixing the transaction price are absent. We show that, despite the market being perfectly competitive and subject to arbitrarily little uncertainty, the inability to jointly determine...

This paper examines the equilibrium correspondence in Arrow-Debreu exchange economies with semi-algebraic preferences. We show that a generic semi-algebraic exchange economy gives rise to a square system of polynomial equations with finitely many solutions. The competitive equilibria form a...

This paper explores the impact of volatility estimation methods on theoretical option values based upon the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) model. Volatility is the only input used in the BSM model that cannot be observed in the market or a priori determined in a contract. Thus, properly calculating...