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Overcoming Moral Hazard with Social Networks in the Worksplace: An Experimental Approach

Dhillon, Amrita; Peeters, Ronald; Muge Yukse, Ayse - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2014

The use of social networks in the workplace has been documented by many authors, although the reasons for their widespread prevalence are less well known. In this paper we present evidence based on a lab experiment that suggests quite strongly that social networks are used by employers to reduce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010757449

Overcoming moral hazard with social networks in the workplace: An experimental approach

Dhillon, Amrita; Peeters, Ronald; Yuksel, Ayse Muge - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2014

The use of social networks in the workplace has been documented by many authors, although the reasons for their widespread prevalence are less well known. In this paper we present evidence based on a combined eld-laboratory experiment that social networks are used by employers to reduce worker...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010938749

COMPETITIVE PRICING IN SOCIALLY NETWORKED ECONOMIES

Allouch, Nizar; Wooders, Myrna - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2002

In the context of a socially networked economy, this paper demonstrates an Edgeworth equivalence between the set of competitive allocations and the core. Each participant in the economy may have multiple links with other participants and the equilibrium network may be as large as the entire set...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368696

Did Science Cause the Industrial Revolution?

O Grada, Cormac - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010938748

World-Leading Research and its Measurement

Oswald, Andrew J. - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2009

quality (rather than merely quantity) of a nation’s science? To try to address this, I examine objective data on the world …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146957

The Economics of Coercion and Conflict: an Introduction

Harrison, Mark - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2013

This chapter introduces the author’s selected papers on the economics of coercion and conflict. It defines coercion and … conflict and relates them. In conflict, adversaries make costly investments in the means of coercion. The application of … coercion does not remove choice but limits it to options that leave the victim worse off than before. Coercion and conflict are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010758408

Reputation and Cooperation in Defence

Hugh Jones, David; Zultan, Ro'i - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2011

Surprisingly high levels of within-group cooperation are observed in conflict situations. Ex- periments confirm that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010758491

The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa

Michalopoulos, Stelios; Papaioannou, Elias - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2013

geographic, economic, and historical trait, including proxies of pre-colonial conflict, predicts partitioning by the national … borders. Second, we exploit a detailed geo-referenced database that records various types of conflict across African regions … and show that civil conflict is concentrated in the historical homeland of partitioned ethnicities. We also document that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010758514

Reciprocity towards Groups

Hugh Jones, David; Leroch, Martin A - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2011

People exhibit group reciprocity when they retaliate, not against a person who harmed them, but against another person in that person's group. We tested for group reciprocity in laboratory experiments. Subjects played a Prisoner's Dilemma with partners from different groups. They then allocated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010862687

Enfranchisement, Intra-Elite Conflict and Bargaining

Ghosal, Sayantan; Proto, Eugenio - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2006

Does power sharing between competing elites result in franchise extension to non-elites? In this paper, we argue that competing, risk-averse elites will enfranchise non-elites as in-surance against future, uncertain imbalances in relative bargaining power. We show that negligibly small changes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368619