This paper examines how the transparency in monetary policy decision can impact the likelihood of currency crisis in a simple open economy model with public debt. In the presence of opacity, it is found that if the debt is high, the government will devaluate and vice versa, and the...

We use a Taylor rule with time-varying policy coefficients in combination with an unobserved components model for the output gap to estimate the uncertainty about future values of the Federal Funds Rate. The model makes it possible to separate ex-ante interest rate uncertainty into three...

In this paper, we examine the link between political transparency of a common central bank (CCB) and decentralized supply-side fiscal policies in a monetary union. We find that the opacity of a conservative CCB has a restrictive effect on national fiscal policies since each government...

This paper uses real-time data for the U.S. to estimate out-of-sample forecast uncertainty about the Federal Funds Rate. By combining a Taylor rule with an unobserved components model of economic fundamentals I separate forecast uncertainty into economically interpretable components that...

This paper extends the results of Kobayashi (2003) and Ciccarone and Marchetti (2009) by considering the optimal choice of central bank conservativeness. It is shown that the government can choose a sufficiently populist but opaque central banker so that higher multiplicative uncertainty...