Large companies are usually organized into business units, yet some activitiesare almost always centralized in a company-wide functional unit. We firstshow that organizations endogenously create an incentive conflict between functionalmanagers (who desire excessive standardization) and...

When economists study incentives in organizations,the main focus has been on using monetary paymentsin exchange for performance on specific measurabledimensions. But organizations use a wide varietyof means to motivate their workers. One suchmethod which has not been studied much to date, isthe...

This paper proposes a simple framework to study incentives and matching in the marketfor teachers. The framework is used to investigate the consequences of introducing incentivepay for teachers when contracts have both a matching and an incentive effect. Our analysissuggests that school...

We provide evidence on the match between …rms, managers, and incentives using anew survey that contains information on managers' risk preferences and human capital,on their compensation schemes, and on the …rms they work for. The data is consistentwith the equilibrium correlations predicted by...

We present a theoretical framework and empirical strategy to measure the causal effect ofinterim feedback on individuals’ performance. Our identification strategy exploits a naturalexperiment in a leading UK university where different departments have historically differentrules on the...

We present evidence on the effect of social connections between workers and managerson productivity in the workplace. To evaluate whether the existence of social connections isbeneficial to the firm’s overall performance, we explore how the effects of social connectionsvary with the strength...

This paper analyses the empirical determinants of contract length, a key andyet neglected dimension of contractual structure. I estimate contract length andcontract type jointly using original data on tenancy agreements signed between1870 and 1880 in the district of Siracusa, Italy.The findings...

We present evidence on whether workers have social preferences by comparing workers’ productivityunder relative incentives, where individual effort imposes a negative externality on others,to their productivity under piece rates, where it does not. We find that the productivity of theaverage...

We show that the effect of eviction threats on unobservable investment effort can be positive. Wedemonstrate this apparently counter-intuitive result in a model of tenancy where investment by atenant in the current period raises the chances of doing well in the next period, and...

Improving accountability in public services has been a central ob-jective of many public sector reforms in recent years. Chief amongthese have been efforts to generate observable performance measuresas a basis for monitoring performance. This paper examines a nat-ural experiment in regimes...