Zahlreiche Studien weisen auf hohe Misserfolgsquoten von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen hin, messen dies jedoch vor allem anhand finanzieller Indikatoren, während eine mitarbeiterbezogene Betrachtung unterbleibt. Kritisch wird die Situation, wenn hochqualifizierte, aber unzufriedene...

Ausgangspunkt ist die These, dass Universitäten und Business Schools den Studierenden sehr wenig oder gar keine Möglichkeit bieten, sich während ihres Studiums mit dem Themenkreis Wirtschafts- bzw. Management-Ethik und soziale Verantwortung (CSR - Corporate Social Responsibility) zu befassen....

Adopting a dynamic perspective, this paper investigates age-related staffing patterns in German establishments and their effect on innovative performance. First, we investigate how establishments achieve the necessary workforce rejuvenation - from the inflow of younger or from outflows of older...

A series of seminal theoretical papers argues that poaching of employees may hamper company-sponsored general training. However, the extent of poaching, its determinants and consequences, remains an open empirical question. We provide a novel empirical identification strategy for poaching and...

In Germany, apprenticeship training firms currently face a shrinking number of qualified school-leavers because of smaller birth cohorts and an increasing proportion of school leavers aiming for higher education. This paper investigates whether a programme that supports firms to train...

In this paper the issue from personnel economics such as work intensity has been investigated. George Akerlof back in 1976 argued that the real life failed to correspond to the standard general equilibrium model set by Arrow-Debreu. In the real life information is neither complete nor it’s...

Firms are affected by the product demand. This leads to employment adjustments. In the literature we find only very few contributions investigating the issue whether internal adjustments are linked and which relationships exist with external adjustments. Are they of a complementary or...

The extent to which a knowledge-intensive firm should induce cooperation between its employees is analyzed in a model of relational contracting between a firm (principal) and its employees (two agents). The agents can cooperate by helping each other, i.e. provide effort that increases the...

This paper analyses and compares optimal relational contracts between a principal/firm and a set of agents when (a) only aggregate output can be observed, and (b) individual outputs can be observed. We show that the optimal contract under (a) is a team incentive scheme where each agent is paid a...

Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in human-capital-intensive industries where teamwork is so common? We present a model that aims to explain this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we analyze the conditions for implementing peerdependent incentive regimes when...