Similar Search Results

Povel, Paul; Singh, Rajdeep; Winton, Andrew - EconWPA - 2003

We examine firm managers' incentives to commit fraud in a model where firms seek funding from investors and investors … can monitor firms at a cost in order to get more precise information about firm prospects. We show that fraud incentives … funded without committing fraud, whereas in bad times investors are more vigilant and it is harder to commit fraud …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134707

The excess burden of tax evasion - An experimental detection- concealment contest

Bayer, Ralph C; Sutter, Matthias - EconWPA - 2004

We present an experimental study on the wasted resources associated with tax evasion. This waste arises from taxpayers and tax authorities investing costly effort in the concealment and detection of tax evasion. We show that these socially inefficient efforts - as well as the frequency of tax...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062718

Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests

Kawagoe, Toshiji; Takizawa, Hirokazu - EconWPA - 2005

We conduct experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in which one sender type has an incentive to misrepresent her type. Although that Sender type mostly lies in the experiments, the Receiver tends to believe the Sender's messages. This confirms ``truth bias'' reported in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556670