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Povel, Paul; Singh, Rajdeep; Winton, Andrew - EconWPA - 2003

We examine firm managers' incentives to commit fraud in a model where firms seek funding from investors and investors … can monitor firms at a cost in order to get more precise information about firm prospects. We show that fraud incentives … funded without committing fraud, whereas in bad times investors are more vigilant and it is harder to commit fraud …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134707

When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non- cooperation

Houser, Daniel; Xiao, Erte; McCabe, Kevin; Smith, Vernon - EconWPA - 2005

People can become less cooperative when threatened with sanctions, and researchers have pointed to both 'intentions' and incentives as sources of this effect. This paper reports data from a novel experimental design aimed at determining the relative importance of intentions and incentives in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062715

Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests

Kawagoe, Toshiji; Takizawa, Hirokazu - EconWPA - 2005

We conduct experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in which one sender type has an incentive to misrepresent her type. Although that Sender type mostly lies in the experiments, the Receiver tends to believe the Sender's messages. This confirms ``truth bias'' reported in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556670