Similar Search Results

Povel, Paul; Singh, Rajdeep; Winton, Andrew - EconWPA - 2003

We examine firm managers' incentives to commit fraud in a model where firms seek funding from investors and investors … can monitor firms at a cost in order to get more precise information about firm prospects. We show that fraud incentives … funded without committing fraud, whereas in bad times investors are more vigilant and it is harder to commit fraud …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134707

Simulations, theory, and experiments. Notes from an Historical Perspective

Novarese, Marco - EconWPA - 2004

This paper aims at presenting the methodological approach to simulations, proposed at the beginning of the sixties by a group of scholars of the Carnegie Mellon University. This approach can be defined cognitive and behavioural, because of the attention to real perception and decision-making and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412552

Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests

Kawagoe, Toshiji; Takizawa, Hirokazu - EconWPA - 2005

We conduct experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in which one sender type has an incentive to misrepresent her type. Although that Sender type mostly lies in the experiments, the Receiver tends to believe the Sender's messages. This confirms ``truth bias'' reported in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556670