Similar Search Results

Povel, Paul; Singh, Rajdeep; Winton, Andrew - EconWPA - 2003

We examine firm managers' incentives to commit fraud in a model where firms seek funding from investors and investors … can monitor firms at a cost in order to get more precise information about firm prospects. We show that fraud incentives … funded without committing fraud, whereas in bad times investors are more vigilant and it is harder to commit fraud …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134707

Optimal Audit Policy and Heterogenous Agents

Ratto, Marisa; Vergé, Thibaud - EconWPA - 2003

Frauds can be explained not only in terms of individual willingness to cheat, but may also be driven by opportunities to behave dishonestly. The audit policy should therefore be different for different categories of agents. This paper focuses on the optimal audit policy when there are two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412503

Simulating a Multiproduct Barter Exchange Economy

Levy, Daniel; Bergen, Mark - EconWPA - 2005

We describe a multiproduct barter trading experiment in which students exchange real goods in an open market based on … their own personal preference. The experiment is designed for simulating a pure exchange market in order to demonstrate the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125577

A Laboratory Experiment of Knowledge Diffusion Dynamics

Morone, Piergiuseppe; Taylor, Richard - EconWPA - 2004

This paper aims to study, by means of a laboratory experiment and a simulation model, some of the mechanisms which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125585

The Effect of Shill Bidding upon Prices: Experimental Evidence

Kosmopoulou, Georgia; Silva, Dakshina G. De - EconWPA - 2005

This paper explores, through a series of experiments, the effect of shill bidding upon revenues and prices in auctions. We study the practice of shill bidding in a common value framework. Our findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction that, if bidders are aware of the possibility of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408226

Tacit Coordination in a Decentralized Market Entry Game with Fixed Capacity

Zwick, Rami; Rapoport, Amnon - EconWPA - 1999

Tacit coordination is studied experimentally in a class of iterated market entry games with a relatively small number of potential entrants (n = 6), symmetric players, and fixed entry fees. These games are intended to simulate a situation where a newly emergent market opportunity may be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408234

Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests

Kawagoe, Toshiji; Takizawa, Hirokazu - EconWPA - 2005

We conduct experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in which one sender type has an incentive to misrepresent her type. Although that Sender type mostly lies in the experiments, the Receiver tends to believe the Sender's messages. This confirms ``truth bias'' reported in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556670

Individual Preferences for Giving

Fisman, Raymond; Kariv, Shachar; Markovits, Daniel - EconWPA - 2005

This paper reports an experimental test of individual preferences for giving. We use graphical representations of modified Dictator Games that vary the price of giving. This generates a very rich data set well- suited to studying behavior at the level of the individual subject. We test the data...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118605

Beans as a Medium of Exchange

Fried, Harold; Levy, Daniel - EconWPA - 2005

This note describes an experiment, which is an extension of the experiment proposed by Levy and Bergen (1993). The … experiment is designed to simulate an environment where something that is very similar to fiat money (i.e., is homogenous …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005119382