We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of...

In this paper we used a data set constructed for a companion paper (Fritsche/Stephan, 2000) where we explored the leading indicator properties of different time series for the German business cycle. Now we test for the ability of different indicator series to forecast recessions by using a...

The study examines the reasons for financial crises in 31 emerging market countries during 1980-2001. It estimates a probit model using 23 macroeconomic and financial sector variables. Traditional variables such as unemployment and inflation, as well as several indicators of indebtedness such as...

We model daily catches of fishing boats in the Grand Bank fishing grounds. We use data on catches per species for a number of vessels collected by the European Union in the context of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization. Many variables can be thought to influence the amount caught: a...

In a two-stage two-public good experiment, we study the effect that subjects’ possibility of contributing to a public good in the first stage of the game has on the voluntary contributions to the second public good. Our results show that subjects do not follow either the Nash strategy or the...

We run a public goods experiment with four different treatments. The payoff function is chosen such that the Nash equilibrium (NE) and the collective optimum (CO) are both in the interior of the strategy space. We test the effect of varying the level of the collective optimum on contributions....

The recent literature suggests that people have social preferences with a self-serving bias. Our data analysis reveals that the stylized fact of declining cooperation in repeated public goods experiments results from this bias and adaptation.

Charities publicize the donations they receive, generally according to dollar categories rather than the exact amount. Donors in turn tend to give the minimum amount necessary to get into a category. These facts suggest that donors have a taste for having their donations made public. This paper...

This paper surveys a selection of the literature on the private provision of public goods using the Kolm triangle. (The Kolm triangle is the analogue of an Edgeworth box in an economy with a public good.) We provide simple geometrical proofs of various established results using this graphical...

Current analysis addresses an apparently critical issue of wealth circulation in the society. We try to play a game with the welfare- related burden of taxation. Thus, the Negotiator No.1 stands up for citizens legal and moral rights to social services. The Negotiator No.2 proceeds from the...