This work is focused on identifying a circular pull production control system (PPCS) and make emphasis on the presence of a stability attribute. It is an introductory paper to an extended study of macroeconomic financial stability in a physically open but systemic closed system. Previous work...

This paper looks at the history of money and its modern form from a scientific and mathematical point of view. The approach here is to emphasize simplicity. A straightforward model and algebraic formula for a large economy analogous to the ideal gas law of thermodynamics is proposed. It may be...

Con questo articolo si intende offrire una rassegna critica del dibattito in corso da più di un decennio sul concetto di capitale sociale. Gli studi considerati sono suddivisi in base all’aspetto della struttura sociale cui di volta in volta viene accordata maggiore enfasi. La rassegna si...

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our...

Nel dibattito sulla crescita economica si moltiplicano gli studi che attribuiscono un ruolo rilevante al tessuto sociale e istituzionale dell’economia, nella convinzione che non sia possibile interpretare correttamente i fenomeni economici senza tenere conto della loro dimensione relazionale....

Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We design a range of simple experimental games that test these theories more directly than existing experiments. Our experiments show that subjects are more concerned with increasing...

It is traditional in experimental games to allow participants to choose only actions or possibly communicate intended play. In sequential two-person games, we require first movers to express a preference between responder choices. We find that responder behavior differs substantially according...

Experiments with the ultimatum game -- where one party can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a second party on how to split a pie -- illustrate that conventional game theory has been wrong in its predictions regarding the simplest of bargaining settings: Even when one party has enormous...

Applying Weglorz' models of set theory without the axiom of choice, we investigate Arrow-type social welfare functions for infinite societies with restricted coalition algebras. We show that there is a reasonable, nondictatorial social welfare function satisfying "finite discrimination", if and...

Previous papers on time-inconsistent procrastination assume projects are completed once begun. We develop a model in which a person chooses whether and when to complete each stage of a long-term project. In addition to procrastination in starting a project, a naive person might undertake costly...