We study how social norms and individual rationality in the process of coalition formation sustain a particular form of … phenomenon the `tragedy of the clubs'. We model club formation as a non-cooperative game of coalition formation and surplus …

effect, the core is nonempty when coalition feasible sets are monotonic and players' preferences over public goods have … consume a public good in a coalition with more members. This paper adopts the Drèze and Greenberg (1980) type utility function … where players have preferences over goods as well as coalition members. In a game with anonymous and separable network …

-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise … of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set. …

over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty …, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The … core is empty. …

does not hold for optimistic players. We propose a new core concept to overcome this puzzle and provide numerical …