We develop a model, in which Internet backbone providers decide on private peering agreements, comparing the benefits of private peering relative to being connected only through National Access Points. Backbone providers compete by setting capacities for their networks, capacities on the private...

We study dynamic price adjustment under imperfect competition when consumers have non-time-separable preferences. In our model an intertemporal link arises in the consumers' maximization problems because current consumption decisions affect the utility of future consumption. Thus future demand...

This paper offers a theoretical treatment of information disclosure through patenting. We consider a signaling model in which two domestic firms disclose their competencies to a foreign firm. Conditions are discussed under which separating and pooling equilibria occur, together with a...

We consider a model with two backbones and a finite number of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) connected to the backbones. ISPs decide on private peering agreements, comparing the benefits of private peering to costs. Intra-backbone peering refers to peering between ISPs connected to the same...

We develop a model, in which Internet backbone providers decide on private peering agreements, comparing the benefits of private peering relative to being connected only through National Access Points. Backbone providers compete by setting capacities for their networks, capacities on the private...

We model the organization of the firm as a type of artificial neural network in a duopoly framework. The firm plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma type game, but also must learn to map environmental signals to demand parameters. We study the prospects for cooperation given the need for the firm...

This paper analyzes sequential games of double-sided Bertrand competition in the deposit and credit markets, when banks are free to reject customers and cannot distinguish among borrowers. The timing of competition is crucial when customers apply once. Interest rates are pushed upwards when the...

[Forthcoming, American Economic Review.] We model a War of Attrition with N+K firms competing for N prizes. If firms must pay their full costs until the whole game ends, even after dropping out themselves (as in a standard-setting context), each firm's exit time is independent both of K and of...

Recent developments in information technology (IT) have resulted in the collection of a vast amount of customer specific data. As the IT advances the quality of such information improves. We analyze a sequential spatial model of oligopolistic third degree price discrimination where the firms use...

We investigate how the endogenous acquisition of information, of a certain quality level, on consumers' willingness to pay (location) affects the equilibrium prices and welfare in a spatial price discrimination model. By varying the information quality we are able to obtain the equilibrium in...