Showing 1 - 10 of 166
This paper studies dynamic, endogenous institutional change. We introduce the class of dynamic political games (DPGs), dynamic games in which future political aggregation rules are decided under current ones, and the resulting institutional choices do not affect payoffs or technology directly. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062355
This paper examines existence of Markov equilibria in the class of dynamic political games (DPGs). DPGs are dynamic games in which political institutions are endogenously determined each period. The process of change is both recursive and instrumental: the rules for political aggregation at date...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407586
fact destroy cooperation when it would otherwise be possible. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550938
In experimental studies pairs that repeatedly play the simple coordination game mutual fate control may regularly fail to coordinate when they are given little in-formation, i.e. when subjects are uninformed about the payoff matrix and feed-back is limited to their own payoff. Our experimental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550889
advantage in the conflict or that the joint production process exhibits increasing returns. Nor is there any presumption that …, the formation of alliances tends to reduce the severity of the conflict over the contestable resource. Furthermore …, despite the internal conflict that arises among the winning alliance’s members over the distribution of their joint product …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126004
dependence upon primary commodity exports and a large diaspora substantially increase the risk of conflict. Inconsistent with the … grievance theory, greater ethnic and religious diversity reduce the risk of conflict. The results are robust to correction for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407738
The article aims at suggesting possible conjectures on Al-Qaeda's logic and structure. Even if the organization's secrecy makes any empirical evidence difficult to find, some insight can be provided by economic theory of contests: in this terms, Al-Qaeda can be acknowledged like an agent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408420
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents … conflict in order to appropriate a positive fraction of a stake. An institutional constraint is modelled through an exogenously … conflicting agents are willing to commit themselves to ease the conflict joining an institutional setting they do not ‘disarm …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408438
between buyers and sellers, such as found in Akerlof’s lemons model and Spence’s signaling model and extends the arguments put … all qualities together (lemons) or using external indications of quality to separate them (signaling). Similarly, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125589
We show that, in repeated common interest games without discounting, strong `perturbation implies efficiency' results require that the perturbations must include strategies which are `draconian' in the sense that they are prepared to punish to the maximum extent possible. Moreover, there is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407513