Showing 1 - 10 of 188
Collusion and soft budget constraint are two conspicuous phenomena in transition economies¡¯ banking system. Literature has separately investigated those two phenomena from theoretical point of views. However, the cross-point of both phenomena has been neglected in the research of banking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134539
In this paper we address the question of collusion in mechanisms under asymmetric information by assuming that one of the colluding parties offers a side contract to the other one. We develop a methodology to analyze collusion as an informed principal problem. We show that if collusion occurs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062362
In this paper we address the question of collusion in mechanisms under asymmetric information. We develop a methodology to analyze collusion as an informed principal problem. First, if collusion occurs after the agents accept or reject the principal's offer; the dominant-strategy implementation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550916
In this paper, I study industry-university relations in a principal- agent framework. Following the existing literature, these relations are interpreted in two ways: (1) as occurring through spillovers of knowledge among different groups of researchers, working for different institutional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561799
This work is focused on identifying a circular pull production control system (PPCS) and make emphasis on the presence of a stability attribute. It is an introductory paper to an extended study of macroeconomic financial stability in a physically open but systemic closed system. Previous work...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126234
In this paper we study the mechanics of ``leading by example'' in teams. Leadership is beneficial for the entire team when agents are conformists, i.e., dislike effort differentials. We also show how leadership can arise endogenously and discuss what type of leader benefits a team most.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135020
This paper studies the ability of an agent and a principal to achieve the first-best outcome when the agent invests in an asset that has greater value if owned by the principal than by the agent. When contracts can be renegotiated, a well-known danger is that the principal can holdup the agent,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135093
The paper analyzes voluntary Free Software/Open Source Software (FS/OSS) organization of work. The empirical setting considered is the Debian GNU/Linux operating system. The paper finds that the production process is hierarchical notwithstanding the modular (nearly decomposable) architecture of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412868
This article provides a cognitive foundation of the parameters that regulate a model of the learning curve. Organizational learning and its actual occurrence are linked to the number of available categories and to the amount of information to be processed.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561382
External agents are frequently characterized as necessary for efficiency in team production settings. At the same time, these agents must be constrained from opportunistically exercising their enforcement capabilities. I argue that collective action costs and formal institutions (e.g., golden...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561787