It is known that every continuous time fictitious play process approaches equilibrium in every nondegenerate 2x2 and 2x3 game, and it has been conjectured that convergence to equilibrium holds generally for 2xn games. We give a simple geometric proof of this.

This paper consider the dynamic evolution of algorithmic (recursive) learning rules in a normal form game. It is shown that the system - the population frequencies - is globally stable for any arbitrary N-player normal form game, if the evolutionary process is algorithmic and the `birth process'...

This study describe an experiment on individual learning in the domain of cognitive economics. The authors’ main goal is to observe and to describe how subjects elaborate rules and regularities in problem solving. Involved subjects are asked to choose between different scores related to an...

Investors systematically deviate from rationality when making financial decisions, yet the mechanisms responsible for these deviations have not been identified. Using event-related fMRI, we examined whether anticipatory neural activity would predict optimal and suboptimal choices in a financial...

We study the implementation of constrained-efficient allocations in labour markets where a basic coordination problem leads to an equilibrium matching function. We argue that these allocations can be achieved in equilibrium if wages are determined by ex post bidding. This holds true even in...

This paper examines a mechanism of liquidity-preference fluctuations caused by people's learning behavior. % about the frequency of a liquidity shock. When observing a financial shock, they rationally update their belief so that the subjective probability of encountering it again is higher,...

In this paper, we examine the incentives for central bank activism and caution in a two-country open-economy model with uncertainty and learning. We find that the presence of a strategic interaction between the home and foreign central banks creates an additional motivation for caution in...

In the paper we analyze how the possibility of revealing information to a competitor alters the entry/investment behavior of a first entrant. We show that once it has entered the market, the firm might refrain from making further profitable investments in order to hide information from the...

We model the organization of the firm as a type of artificial neural network in a duopoly framework. The firm plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma type game, but also must learn to map environmental signals to demand parameters. We study the prospects for cooperation given the need for the firm...

Morgan (1983) guaranteed that VSS dominated both FSS and SSR. But it is difficult to calculate the optimal sample size and the optimal reservation price both without recall and with full recall. As VSS without recall is a simplification of VSS with full recall, we will present on appendix a VB30...