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Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism

Lagunoff, Roger; Matsui, Akihiko - EconWPA - 2001

This paper studies the role of memory and communication in games between ongoing organizations. In each organization … the past can be communicated by one generation to the next through ``cheap talk" communication. With costly communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550938

A Very Simple Model of Conflict with Asymmetric Evaluations and Institutional Constraint

Caruso, Raul - EconWPA - 2005

This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents conflict in order to appropriate a positive fraction of a stake. An institutional constraint is modelled through an exogenously fixed element as a feature of a modified Contest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408438

" Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups' "

Anderlini, Luca; Lagunoff, Roger - EconWPA - 2001

We ask whether communication can directly substitute for memory in dynastic repeated games in which short lived … by means of communication. When communication is costless and messages are sent simultaneously, communication mechanisms … or protocols exist that sustain the same set of equilibrium payoffs as in the standard repeated game. When communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407603

Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests

Kawagoe, Toshiji; Takizawa, Hirokazu - EconWPA - 2005

's messages. This confirms ``truth bias'' reported in communication theory in a one-shot, anonymous environment without nonverbal … under certain conditions. We claim that the theory for the evolution of language should address why truthful communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556670

False Modesty

Harbaugh, Rick; To, Dr. Theodore - EconWPA - 2005

Is it always wise to disclose good news? When both the sender and the receiver have private information about the sender's quality, we find that the worst sender type with good news has the most incentive to disclose it, so reporting good news can paradoxically make the sender look bad. If the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118518

Defining rules in cost spanning tree problems through the canonical form

Bergantiños, Gustavo; Vidal-Puga, Juan - EconWPA - 2004

We define the canonical form of a cost spanning tree problem. The canonical form has the property that reducing the cost of any arc, the minimal cost of connecting agents to the source is also reduced. We argue that the canonical form is a relevant concept in this kind of problems and study a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407561

Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions

Lagunoff, Roger - EconWPA - 2005

This paper examines existence of Markov equilibria in the class of dynamic political games (DPGs). DPGs are dynamic games in which political institutions are endogenously determined each period. The process of change is both recursive and instrumental: the rules for political aggregation at date...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407586

Stakeholders in Bilateral Conflict

Manzini, Paola; Ponsati, Clara - EconWPA - 2003

The resolution of a conflict often has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved in the confrontation (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised, models addressing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407596

Battlefields and Marketplaces

Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl - EconWPA - 2002

Divided societies in the developing world experience wasteful struggles for power. We study the relationship between political stability and resources wasted in the struggle within a model of competitive power contests. The model of power contests is similar in structure to models describing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407680

The Structure and Equilibrium Conditions of a Generalized Economic Canopy: A Note

Amavilah, V. Heinrich S. - EconWPA - 2005

This note draws upon ecological models to describe the structure and equilibrium conditions of a generalized economic canopy consisting of three interactive economies assumed to be in competitive epiphytic, parasitic, and host relationships to each other. The maintained hypothesis is that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407682