It is well known since Owen (Management Science, 1968) that the weights in the weighted Shapley value cannot be interpreted as a measure of power (i.e. of the ability to bargain) of the players. This paper proposes a new weight scheme for the Shapley value. Weights in this framework have to be...

We propose a variation of the Hart and Mas-Colell non-cooperative bargaining model for n-person games in coalitional form. This strategic game implements, in the limit, a new NTU-value for the class of monotonic games. This value coincides with the Maschler and Owen value for hyperplane games,...

Using techniques from the non-standard analysis, a non-standard analogue of the Aumann-Shapley random order value of non-atomic games is provided. The paper introduces the notion of effectively ergodic family of automorphism groups. It is shown that for a wide class of games, the non-standard...

This paper introduces a measure of uncertainty in the determination of the Shapley value, illustrates it with examples, and studies some of its properties. The introduced measure of uncertainty quantifies random variations in a player's marginal contribution during the bargaining process. The...

An expanded model of value in cooperative games is presented in which value has either a linear or a proportional mode, and NTU value has either an input or an output basis. In TU games, the modes correspond to the Shapley (1953) and proportional (Feldman (1999) and Ortmann (2000)) values. In...

In cooperative games in which the players are partitioned into groups, we study the incentives of the members of a group to leave it and become singletons. In this context, we model a non-cooperative mechanism in which each player has to decide whether to stay in his group or to exit and act as...

Meta-rules, or rules for making rules, determine the costs of innovation and thus the pace of economic growth. Adapting rules to a changing economic environment through explicit, well-designed meta-rules makes economic growth quicker, less painful, and more certain than adapting rules through...