bargain through some extensive game form. We take an implementation approach, characterizing the possible allocation rules …

, and discusses the application of population game techniques to strategic situations other than $N$-player random-matching …

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise … theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to- one, models. We provide results for a number …

I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso-Crawford substitutability, and … independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are important for two-sided matching theory, where agents are modeled by … implications for the Gale-Shapley algorithm of matching theory. …

Perfect equilibria of dynamic political games. The present paper examines issues of stability and reform when such equilibria … exist. Which environments tend toward institutional stability? Which tend toward reform? We show that when political rules … decisions alone. More generally, we identify sufficient conditions for stability and reform in terms of recursive self selection …

. As an interesting result, it is demonstrated that stability need not be required for the success of a matching mechanism …-makers learns to coordinate on the selection of an equilibrium or a social convention in a two-sided matching game. In the contexts …

-run elasticities of income and price variables. This study also implements CUSUM and CUSUMSQ stability tests on the estimated new …

This paper empirically analyses the stability of the narrow money demand function (M1) in Turkey for the period 1950 … this policy framework satisfies the necessary condition for effectiveness, we estimate and test for the stability of … CUSUMSQ stability tests. We demonstrate that there is a stable money demand function and it could be used as an intermediate …

stability under private agent learning. Appropriately designed expectations based rules can yield optimal rational expectations …