We conduct experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in which one sender type has an incentive to … misrepresent her type. Although that Sender type mostly lies in the experiments, the Receiver tends to believe the Sender …

This paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first price auctions, overbidding with respect to risk …

. Using data from a quasi- experiment in South Africa, I test for discrimination against women and non-whites. The preliminary …

the auction format as revenue equivalence cannot be expected to hold. From a theoretical viewpoint, Myerson's (1981 … more practical solution to the seller's problem is suggested by the "Amsterdam auction," where a premium is offered to … encourage weak bidders to compete aggressively. This auction format, which has been used to sell houses in Amsterdam for …

In a laboratory experiment, subjects played ten two-person 3x3 constant sum games and stated beliefs about the …

We design a novel sequential public goods experiment to study reciprocity, or conditional cooperation. In contrast to … their own contributions on the contributions of other subjects in the experiment. We develop a simple but useful behavioral …’ types are persistent over an experiment; and (2) the types of subjects included in a group affects a group’s ability to …

. In a laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find that …

Economic theory predicts that in a first-price auction with equal and observable valuations, bidders earn zero profits …, bidders will bid less and earn positive profits. Hence, rational players in an auction game should prefer less public … information. We are perhaps more used to seeing these results in the equivalent Bertrand setting. In our experimental auction, we …