degrees. When the decision maker consults only a single expert, the expert withholds substantial information from the decision …

We conduct experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in which one sender type has an incentive to …'s messages. This confirms ``truth bias'' reported in communication theory in a one-shot, anonymous environment without nonverbal … under certain conditions. We claim that the theory for the evolution of language should address why truthful communication …

-BASED ECONOMIC STRUCTURES AND INFORMATION SOCIETIES THAT COMPRISE NETWORKS OF INDIVIDUALS, FIRMS AND COUNTRIES THAT ARE LINKED …

information and feedback so that they have to learn the nature of the game during repeated play. The results lend support to the … lack structural information, which contrasts with common notions of fairness or "manners" in ultimatum bargaining (Camerer …

information to policy makers often have a vested interest in the outcomes. This gives them an incentive to distort information to … manipulate policy decisions. In this article we argue that reputation or penalties for lying do not always induce information … information about policy consequences. This has the advantage that policy makers can affect the preferences of the information …

contrasting revealed and stated preference information. However, a short, neutral cheap-talk script appears to exacerbate rather …

improves consumer information and increases the intensity of price competition. …

the intensity of the information possessed. Equilibrium forecasts are then systematically less precise than under …

We introduce cheap talk in a dynamic investment model with information externalities. We first show how social learning … investment tax can increase welfare. The more precise the sender's information, the higher her incentives to truthfully reveal … her private information. …