different productivities or skills, are employed by firms offering wages that depend both on the agents’ individual skill level … contract, periods of unemployment are characterised by declining benefits. Agents are further punished for long unemployment by … reducing expected future utility. A new result obtained from this approach is the observation that under an efficient contract …

two-period contract with termination at the end of the first period. By comparing the two hierarchies -- ¡°bank-firm¡± and …, which the collusive bank can extract, and makes it more costly for the government to implement this contract. However … other equilibrium where she sticks to her commitment and excludes collusion from the contract relationship. Here, collusion …

In this paper, we prove that two firms can choose not to include a termination clause in their partnership contract … writing a contract without a termination clause is a credible commitment even when partners can add such a clause in the … contract in any moment of their relationship. …