Reciprocity information and wage personalization
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Zheng, Kaiming ; Wang, Xiaoyuan ; Ni, Debing |
Published in: |
China economic review : an international journal. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1043-951X, ZDB-ID 1117248-4. - Vol. 68.2021, p. 1-17
|
Subject: | Contract | Moral Hazard | Personalization | Reciprocity | Reference point | Moral hazard | Austauschtheorie | Social exchange theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Persönlichkeitspsychologie | Personality psychology | Experiment | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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