Relaxation algorithms provide a powerful method of finding noncooperative equilibria in general synchronous games. Through use of the Nikaido-Isoda function, the Nash solution to a broad category of constrained, multiplayer, non-zerosum games can easily be found. We provide solutions to some...

The recent literature suggests that people have social preferences with a self-serving bias. Our data analysis reveals that the stylized fact of declining cooperation in repeated public goods experiments results from this bias and adaptation.

We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of...

We study whether "coercive" public provision or voluntary private provision of public goods can survive when individuals who "vote with their feet" can choose between communities that differ in the way that public goods are provided. We obtain the following findings: (i) an equilibrium always...

This paper proves an equilibrium selection result for a class of games with strategic substitutes. Specifically, for a general class of binary action, N-player games, we prove that each such game has a unique equilibrium strategy profile. Using a global game approach first introduced by Carlsson...

We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share...

A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve...

We give the reader a tour of good energy optimization models that explicitly deal with uncertainty. The uncertainty usually stems from unpredictability of demand and/or prices of energy, or from resource availability and prices. Since most energy investments or operations involve irreversible...

The periodical re-auction of a water monopoly concession causes the danger of underinvestment. If the life-time of specific assets such as water pipes exceeds the contract length and transferring the ownership of assets is difficult, the incumbent franchisee faces a hold-up problem. Using a...

Due to the increasing discussion about liberalisation in the piped water industry municipal authorities in several European countries consider modifications of their water utilities’ structure such as legal constitution, business objectives or private participation. The purpose of this paper...