In an abstract model of division problems, we study division rules that are not manipulable through a reallocation of individual characteristic vectors within a coalition (e.g. reallocation of claims in bankruptcy problems). A coalition can be formed if members of the coalition are connected on...

This paper models individual choices of social groups and the formation of group identity, and examines the conditions with which the group identity reinforces the productivity of individuals. A social group is defined as a network that provides with a market for interactions to its members....

This paper is motivated by a practical income (or wealth) taxation problem: For a public good economy where the provision of public goods is to be financed by income taxes collected from individuals, what is the optimal feasible tax mechanism when a social planner is relatively uninformed of the...

Consider a multilateral bargaining problem where negotiation is conducted by a sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions. We are interested in an environment where bargaining protocols are determined endogenously. During each bilateral bargaining session of Rubinstein (1982), two players...

It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pairwise stability is not logically related with the (weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for pairwise stability when group deviations are allowed. Group...

This paper considers the "negotiation game" (Busch and Wen, 1995) which combines the features of two-person alternating offers bargaining and repeated games. Despite the forces of bargaining, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of equilibria some of which involve delay in...

Consider a multilateral bargaining problem where negotiation is conducted by a sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions. We are interested in an environment where bargaining protocols are determined endogenously. During each bilateral bargaining session of Rubinstein (1982), two players...

This paper studies the bargaining game between the president and the congress when these two players have conflicting claims to a fixed amount of resources. I distinguish between situations of "pure divided government", that is when the congress is united "against" the president, and the...

To investigate players' incentives in coalition formation, we consider a legislative bargaining game with asymmetric information about time preferences. The force that does not exist in usual bargaining games with unanimity is that due to majority rule, if a player signals himself as the patient...

We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by accepting the settlement of an arbitrator. The impact of pragmatic arbitrators -that enforce concessions that precede their appointment - is compared with that of arbitrators that act on principle -...