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Optimal Common Value Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders
Singh, Rajdeep; Povel, Paul - Econometric Society - 2004
How do informational asymmetries between bidders affect the outcome of common value auctions? Should the seller accept …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699653
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The Strategic Impact of Pace in Double Auction Bargaining
Gjerstad, Steven - Econometric Society - 2004
This paper evaluates performance of human subjects and instances of a bidding model that interact in continuous-time double auction experiments. Asks submitted by instances of the seller model ("automated sellers") maximize the seller's expected surplus relative to a heuristic belief function,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063604
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Matching and Price Competition
Levin, Jonathan; Bulow, Jeremy - Econometric Society - 2004
We develop a model in which firms set their salary levels before matching with workers. Wages fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise almost as much, implying little inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages become compressed. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328996
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A Rent Extraction Theory of Right of First Refusal
Choi, Albert - Econometric Society - 2004
When a seller gives a buyer a right of first refusal, although it reduces the competing buyers' profits and creates an inefficiency, it always increases the joint profit of the seller and the right holder. Right of first refusal with a consideration (e.g., a payment from the right holder to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342352
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Pure Strategy Equilibria of Multidimensional and Non-Monotonic Auctions
Araujo, Aloisio; Filho, Luciano I. de Castro - Econometric Society - 2004
auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. When the conditions are not satisfied, we are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328867
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Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design
Skrzypacz, Andrzej; DeMarzo, Peter M.; Kremer, Ilan - Econometric Society - 2004
We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities. That is, they offer …-price and second-price auctions) are not well defined unless the set of securities is restricted to an ordered set. For example …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005329016
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The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions
Weinschelbaum, Federico; Arozamena, Leandro - Econometric Society - 2004
Most of the literature on auctions assumes that the auctioneer owns the object on sale. However most auctions are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063558
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Survival Auctions
Ye, Lixin; Kagel, John; Pevnitska, Svetlana - Econometric Society - 2004
Ascending price clock auctions with drop-out information typically yield outcomes closer to equilibrium predictions … than do comparable sealed-bid auctions. However clock auctions require congregating all bidders for a fixed time interval … paper studies whether such inefficiencies can be removed by implementing a survival auction mechanism. Survival auctions are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063602
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Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design
Skrzypacz, Andrzej; DeMarzo, Peter M.; Kremer, Ilan - Econometric Society - 2004
We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities. That is, they offer …-price and second-price auctions) are not well defined unless the set of securities is restricted to an ordered set. For example …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063612
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An optimal auction with identity-dependent externalities
Aseff, Jorge; Chade, Hector - Econometric Society - 2004
We analyze the problem of a seller who has multiple units of a good and faces a set of buyers with unit demands, private information, and identity-dependent externalities. We derive the seller's optimal mechanism and characterize its main properties. As an application of the model, we consider...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699600