Johnson (1953-54) offered a powerful explanation for the existence of equilibrium tariffs when he showed that governments face incentives to deviate from free trade even in the face of retaliation by their trading partners. Subsequent analyses by Kennan and Riezman (1988) and Syropoulos (2002)...

It is often observed that in order to serve the domestic market, foreign firms not only export but also control domestic firms through foreign direct investment (FDI). This paper examines the effects of tariffs, production subsidies, and foreign ownership regulation on prices, outputs, profits,...

In this paper, I develop and test a model of dumping among imperfectly competitive firms in different countries that face stochastic demand. In the theoretical model, I show that foreign firms dump when they face weak demand in their own markets. I then show that an antidumping duty can improve...

Some cultural goods, like clothes and films, are consumed socially and are thus characterized by the same consumption network externalities as languages. At the same time, producers of new cultural goods in any one country draw on the stock of ideas generated by previous cultural production in...

This paper uses household-level data of cellular usage to provide estimates of the implied switching costs that preclude consumers from switching providers in the face of competing offers. Our estimation differs from previous switching costs studies in that we are able to observe individual...

Received literature have shown that if competing networks are restricted to linear and uniform pricing, high access charges can facilitate collusion; a result that breaks down if we allow for non-linear and discriminatory pricing, however. We show that by adding unbalanced calling pattern to the...

This paper first inverts a general class of matrices for solving Bertrand equilibria from arbitrary coalition structures in linear Bertand oligopolies. It then studies merger incentives and obtains two main results; 1) for any asymmetric costs, mergers of any size are profitable; 2) a merger will...

We introduce capacity constrained competition between market-making intermediaries in a model in which agents can choose between trading with intermediaries, joining a search market or remaining inactive. Recently, market-making by a monopolistic intermediary has been analyzed by Rust and Hall...

There are a lot of goods which have network externalities. While the number of players who have such a good is small, they may not get enough utility from the goods. That is, players have an incentive to delay their decision, when they purchase the goods with network externalities. Delay causes...