which conflict between asymmetric agents can be resolved. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for an …Due to the high costs of conflict both in theory and practice, we examine and experimentally test the conditions under … indivisible prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may agree to allocate the prize by fair coin flip to avoid the costs of …

which conflict between asymmetric agents can be resolved. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for an …Due to the high costs of conflict both in theory and practice, we examine and experimentally test the conditions under … indivisible prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may agree to allocate the prize by fair coin flip to avoid the costs of …

diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with …

in the defenders valuation and it decreases in the overall number of battles in the contest. However, the defender … engages in the contest significantly more often than predicted and the aggregate expenditures by both parties exceed predicted … contest. …

Using a two-player Tullock-type contest we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be … equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss … possible contest design applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research. …

We use a Tullock-type contest model to show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically … and revenue equivalent to each other. We consider a two-player contest, where outcome-contingent payoffs are linear … may yield different equilibrium payoffs. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future …

We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the …

, we show that substituting the auction contest success function for the lottery contest success function in a conflict may … radicals. Our results demonstrate the importance of the choice of the institutions of conflict, as modeled by the contest …

The equilibrium of a two-stage conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding stage-one offers, proposers … reduced conflict expenditures. …