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Why Can’t We Be Friends? Entitlements, bargaining, and conflict.
Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012
We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817376
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Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict
Kimbrough, Erik O; Sheremeta, Roman M - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2014
We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a … be avoided than when roles are assigned randomly. Earned entitlements impact behavior in three important ways: (1 … intensity. This result differs from previous experimental evidence from ultimatum games in which earned entitlements tend to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817410
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Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict.
Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012
non-binding, proposers offer nothing and conflicts always arise. Laboratory experiments confirm that binding side …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647549
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Commitment Problems in Conflict Resolution.
Kimbrough, Erik O.; Rubin, Jared; Sheremeta, Roman M.; … - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013
Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817424
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Resolving Conflicts by a Random Device
Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2011
. Laboratory experiments confirm that the availability of the random device partially eliminates conflicts when agents are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323518
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The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks
Kovenock, Dan; Roberson, Brian; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2010
This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker's objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender's objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008678320
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Fight or Flight? Defending Against Sequential Attacks in the Game of Siege
Deck, Cary; Sheremeta, Roman - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2010
This paper examines theory and behavior in a two-player game of siege, sequential attack and defense. The attacker’s objective is to successfully win at least one battle while the defender’s objective is to win every battle. Theoretically, the defender either folds immediately or, if his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008680350
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Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse: Avoiding Conflicts through Side Payments
Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2010
-binding, proposers offer nothing and conflicts always arise. Laboratory experiments confirm that binding side-payments reduce conflicts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008693684
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When Parity Promotes Peace: Resolving Conflict Between Asymmetric Agents.
Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy W. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013
Due to the high costs of conflict both in theory and practice, we examine and experimentally test the conditions under which conflict between asymmetric agents can be resolved. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for an indivisible prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817427
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When Parity Promotes Peace: Resolving Conflict Between Asymmetric Agents
Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy W. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013
Due to the high costs of conflict both in theory and practice, we examine and experimentally test the conditions under which conflict between asymmetric agents can be resolved. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for an indivisible prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817437