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Smith, L - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1996

competitive market maker faces n risk neutral traders with unit demands or suppliers. It is private information whether any given …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005450536

USING PRIVILEGED INFORMATION TO MANIPULATE MARKETS: INSIDERS, GURUS, AND CREDIBILITY.

BENABOU, R.; LAROQUE, G. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005450539

Pathological Models of Observational Learning.

Smith, L.; Sorensen, P. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005450550

Adoption of Technologies with Network Affects: An Empirical Examination of the Adoption of Automated Teller Machines.

Saloner, G.; Shepard, A. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005748845

Agency Costs in the Process of Development.

Acemoglu, D.; Zilibotti, F. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1996

We analyse an economy where production is subject to moral hazard.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005748847

THEINFORMATIVENESS OF PRICES: SEARCH WITH LEARNING AND INFLATION UNCERTAINTY.

BENABOU, R.; GERTNER, R. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005748852

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE LITIGATION PROCESS.

FARBER, H.S.; WHITE, M.J. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005748883

Sigle Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information.

Athey, S. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1997

This paper derives sufficient conditions for a class of games of complete information , such as first price auctions … private information about his own type (for example, a bidder's value for an object or a firm's marginal cost of production …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005748990

Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence.

Acemoglu, D.; Pischki, J.S. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1996

This paper offers and tests a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749011

Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests.

Schmidt, K.M. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749038