Payments in kind pose an enduring and empirically important puzzle. The paper provides a formalization of the popular view that payment in kind are due to financial constraints. The key assumption is that buyers' liquidity is private information. Buyers who are financially constrained may prove...

Due to underlying technological differences, industries differ in their need for external finance. Since the services provided by the financial sector are largely immobile across countries, the pattern of specialization should be influenced by the degree of financial development. We find that...

In this paper we discuss the pricing of commercial real estate index linked swaps (CREILS). This particular pricing problem has been studied by Buttimer et al. (1997) in a previous paper. <p> We show that their results are only approximately correct and that the true theoretical price of the swap...</p>

It has long been argued that trade restrictions can be motivated by insurance considerations in the absence of full risk diversification. Recent literature suggests that markets for risk can alleviate resistance to reform and protectionist lobby group pressure. We empirically address the...

Recent literature has questioned the existence of a learning foundation for the partially cursed equilibrium. This paper closes the gap by showing that a partially cursed equilibrium corresponds to a particular analogy-based expectation equilibrium.

The traditional avoidance literature undeservedly neglects tax base distribution as a factor affecting the avoidance price, and generally assumed to be equal to the avoidance cost. In reality, avoidance providers are usually either high-skilled specialists or insiders. The strong collusion thus,...

Failures of government policies often provoke opposite reactions from citizens; some call for a reversal of the policy while others favor its continuation in stronger form. We offer an explanation of such polarization, based on a natural bimodality of preferences in political and economic...

We present a model of financial contracting in the presence of asymmetric information between entrepreneur and investor. Either liquidation threat or governance control can be used to protect investor’s interests against expropriation risk. The two parties first agree to a financial...

In this paper we study a sender-receiver game between an uninformed government and two informed lobbyists. There is a conflict of interest between government and lobbyists in the sense that the government's payoff is state-dependent while lobbyists prefer a certain policy irrespective of the...

We experimentally investigate the effect of cheap talk in a bargaining game with one-sided asymmetric information. A seller has private information about his or her skill and is provided an opportunity to communicate this information to a buyer through a written message. Four different...