Showing 1 - 10 of 61
Payments in kind pose an enduring and empirically important puzzle. The paper provides a formalization of the popular view that payment in kind are due to financial constraints. The key assumption is that buyers' liquidity is private information. Buyers who are financially constrained may prove...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423787
In this paper we discuss the pricing of commercial real estate index linked swaps (CREILS). This particular pricing problem has been studied by Buttimer et al. (1997) in a previous paper. <p> We show that their results are only approximately correct and that the true theoretical price of the swap...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649388
It has long been argued that trade restrictions can be motivated by insurance considerations in the absence of full risk diversification. Recent literature suggests that markets for risk can alleviate resistance to reform and protectionist lobby group pressure. We empirically address the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649457
Due to underlying technological differences, industries differ in their need for external finance. Since the services provided by the financial sector are largely immobile across countries, the pattern of specialization should be influenced by the degree of financial development. We find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190862
We present a model of financial contracting in the presence of asymmetric information between entrepreneur and investor. Either liquidation threat or governance control can be used to protect investor’s interests against expropriation risk. The two parties first agree to a financial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423817
In this paper we study a sender-receiver game between an uninformed government and two informed lobbyists. There is a conflict of interest between government and lobbyists in the sense that the government's payoff is state-dependent while lobbyists prefer a certain policy irrespective of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423873
We experimentally investigate the effect of cheap talk in a bargaining game with one-sided asymmetric information. A seller has private information about his or her skill and is provided an opportunity to communicate this information to a buyer through a written message. Four different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649157
This study investigates under what circumstances there exist a separating equilibrium in which competent leaders choose incompetent co-workers and incompetent leaders choose competent co-workers. The driving force for the competent leader is the insurance motive; if things go wrong he can blame...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649179
We study an asymmetric information model in which two firms are active on a market where buyers only observe the average quality supplied. Quantities and cost structures are exogenously given and firms compete in quality. Before choosing their qualities, they bargain over a perfectly enforcable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649261
The Kyle (1985) model is extended to take into account market maker competition and the spread. It is shown that with a spread the Kyle model has a Nash equilibrium also with two market makers, not only with three or more, as shown in earlier research. The spread is endogenized, and two testable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649280