Following the liberalisation of the electricity industry since the early 1990s, many sector regulators have recognised the potential for cost efficiency improvement in the networks through incentive regulation aided by benchmarking and productivity analysis. This approach has often resulted in...

Increasingly, local opposition to new electricity grid development projects cause lengthy delays and places financial and practical strain on the projects. The structure of the electricity industry is in transition due to the emergence of smaller but more numerous electricity generation...

Efficiency and productivity analysis is a central concept in incentive-based regulation of network utilities. However, the efficiency measures obtained from benchmarking predominantly reflect short term performance and hence, provide only a snapshot of the firm's path towards its long run...

Ambitious renewable energy targets and an aging infrastructure necessitate a substantial upgrading and expansion of the electricity transmission networks around Europe and beyond. Although vital for the functioning of the economy, grid development projects are often met by public opposition,...

Bester and Strausz (2000) showed that the revelation principle of Bester and Strausz (2001) does not apply in a setting of many agents and no commitment. In their counterexample only one agent has private information. We show that if the parties can make ex ante transfers the revelation...

The paper assesses the demand for rural electricity services and contrasts it with the technology options available for rural electrification. Decentralised Distributed Generation can be economically viable as reflected by case studies reported in literature and analysed in our field study....

Privatisation of utilities is about ownership rather than control. Liberalisation can induce greather improvements in performance than privatisation alone. Regulation id inevitably inefficient, and adequately competitive network services may improve efficiency. History indicates that regulated...

According to standard theory, the set of implementable outcome functions is reduced if the mechanism or contract can be renegotiated ex post. In some cases contracts can achieve nothing and so, for example, the holdup problem may be severe. This paper shows that if the mechanism is designed in...

The so-called “electricity wholesale market” is, in fact, a sequence of several markets. The chain is closed with a provision for “balancing,” in which energy from all wholesale markets is balanced under the authority of the Transmission Grid Manager (TSO in Europe, ISO in the United...