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implementation of efficient allocation by iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, using generalisation of Olszewski …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005113772
We study the strategic behavior of voters in a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters'preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783750
This paper shows that generators exercised increasing market power in the England and Wales wholesale electricity market in the second half of the 1990s despite declining market concentration. It examines whether this was consistent with static, non-cooperative oligopoly models, which are widely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005113735
This paper generalises the approach taken by Dasgupta & Maskin (1986) and Simon (1989) and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in games with continuous strategy spaces and discontinuous payoff functions. The conditions can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005113885
factors for energy taxes are the optimal tariff argument, the need to correct externalities such as global warming, and second …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647389
. We identify an important asymmetry between positive and negative externalities and show that centralization may not be e …¢ cient in economies with positive externalities even when regions are identical and centralization does not entail a loss of … accountability. We also show that decentralization can only Pareto dominate centralization in economies with negative externalities. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008552431
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478564
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647391
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647419
In this paper I propose a general model of repeated strategic interaction with possibly private information, which is particulary suitable to study learning processes.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647492