We consider repeated games with transferable utility: players have an endowment of wealth in each period in which transfers can be made. We show that if endowments are large enough and the comon discount factor high enough, then a trongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium (SRP) in the sense of...

This paper generalises the approach taken by Dasgupta & Maskin (1986) and Simon (1989) and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in games with continuous strategy spaces and discontinuous payoff functions. The conditions can be...

In this paper I propose a general model of repeated strategic interaction with possibly private information, which is particulary suitable to study learning processes.

Renewable energy sources have a critical role to play in contributing to the diversity, sustainability and security of energy supplies. The main objectives of the paper is to gain an understanding of UK households’preferences for the type of mechanism that is used to support renewables. Two...

In financial markets with asymmetric information, traders may have an incentive to forgo profitable deals today in order to preserve their informational advantage for future deals. This sort of manipulative behaviour has been studied in markets with one informed trader (Kyle 1985, Chakraborty...

Rational herd behavior and informationally efficient security prices have long been considered to be mutually exclusive but for exceptional cases. In this paper we describe the conditions on the underlying information structure that are necessary and sufficient for informational herding and...

Relying on University of Michigan data on consumers.in.ation expectations, we establish some stylized facts on the process of in.ation expectation formation across different demographic groups. Percentile time series models are employed to test for rationality and to study learning dynamics...

We study equilibrium retention rules in a dynamic common agency game. The decision to reappoint or not is made by a committee consisting of two principals: the retention decision is uncertain if the two principals disagree. We demonstrate that all equilibrium paths exhibit what we call strategic...

The risk premium is affected by loss aversion and probability distortions as well as utility curvature. We introduce two variants - the total risk premium relative to objective expected value, and the subjective risk premium relative to perceived expected value. Approximate solutions for each...