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Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly

Manelli, Alejandro M.; Vincent, Daniel R. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

The seller of N distinct objects is uncertain about the buyer’s valuation for those objects. The seller’s problem, to maximize expected revenue, consists of maximizing a linear functional over a convex set of mechanisms. A solution to the seller’s problem can always be found in an extreme...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008489607

(Self-) Enforcement of Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism Contracts

Janssen, Josef - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 1999

International climate protection investments (Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism projects) are burdened with problems of contract enforcement, which prevent the realisation of efficiency gains associated with these investments. The paper analyses this problem from the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385449

Bidding among Friends and Enemies

Ettinger, David - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

We consider an auction setting in which potential buyers, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We study the impact of these price-externalities on the first-price auction and the second-price auction in a symmetric information framework. First, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423117

The Allocation of European Union Allowances: Lessons, Unifying Themes and General Principles

Buchner, Barbara K.; Carraro, Carlo; Ellerman, A. Denny - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

This paper is the concluding chapter of Rights, Rents and Fairness: Allocation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme … lessons and general principles to be learnt from the allocation of allowances in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme … allocation process and on what are the global implications of the EU ETS. As has become obvious during the first allocation phase …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570294

Over-Allocation or Abatement? A Preliminary Analysis of the Eu Ets Based on the 2005 Emissions Data

Buchner, Barbara; Ellerman, Denny - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

which over-allocation and abatement have taken place in 2005. We propose a measure by which over-allocation can be judged …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230894

Auction Design without Commitment

Vartiainen, Hannu - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

We study auction design when parties cannot commit themselves to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game and the buyers choose their outside option at all stages. We assume that the seller has a leading role in equilibrium selection at any stage of the game. Stationary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570289