Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Carbajal, Juan Carlos ; Mu̕alem, Ahuva |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 124.2020, p. 386-405
|
Subject: | Allocation networks | Incentive compatibility | Incremental values | Multi-item allocation problems | Private budgets | Revenue equivalence | Allokation | Allocation | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory |
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