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Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games
Dimitrov, Dinko; Sung, Shao-Chin - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008
either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230821
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Defining Rules in Cost Spanning Tree Problems Through the Canonical Form
Vidal-Puga, Juan J.; Bergantiños, Gustavo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
We define the canonical form of a cost spanning tree problem. The canonical form has the property that reducing the cost of any arc, the minimal cost of connecting agents to the source is also reduced. We argue that the canonical form is a relevant concept in this kind of problems and study a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230826
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The Egalitarian Sharing Rule in Provision of Public Projects
Savvateev, Alexei; Bogomolnaia, Anna; Breton, Michel Le; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005
cost within jurisdiction. We show that these two principles always yield a core-stable partition but a Nash stable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385438
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Finding Maxmin Allocations in Cooperative and Competitive Fair Division
Dall'Aglio, Marco; Luca, Camilla Di - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011
We consider upper and lower bounds for maxmin allocations of a completely divisible good in both competitive and cooperative strategic contexts. We then derive a subgradient algorithm to compute the exact value up to any fixed degree of precision.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421244
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The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension
Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the … minimal dominant set returns this core. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385367
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The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games
Zhao, Jingang - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008
This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423160
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The ?-Core and Coalition Formation
Chander, Parkash - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
This paper reinterprets the ? -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that … by a coalition, the nonmembers will have incentives to break apart into singletons, as is assumed in the definition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423240
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The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets
Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R.; Young, H. Peyton - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013
sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665513
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Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games
Dimitrov, Dinko; Sung, Shao Chin - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011
We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in … sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009189885
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Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values
Forges, Françoise; Orzach, Ram - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core … form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674341